Book Review: Hell: The Logic of Damnation
What is hell, and do some people stay there forever?
I have always been both fascinated and troubled by the doctrine of hell. So, when I noticed there was a book addressing this issue head on, it immediately grabbed my interest. In Hell: The Logic of Damnation, Jerry Walls aims to defend the Christian doctrine of hell against “two fundamental problems” facing it in modern Anglophone culture, namely, “the alleged immorality and unintelligibility of the doctrine of eternal hell” (p. 15). To do this, he helpfully distinguishes between six different views of the eschatological fate of those not in Christ: (1) the traditional popular view, (2) the traditional orthodox view, (3) the traditional Calvinistic view, (4) the modified orthodox view, (5) the hopeful universalist view, and (6) the convinced universalist view (pp. 12-14). The main aim of the book is “to show that some traditional views of hell can be successfully defended against both of these charges” (p. 15).
The book is divided into six chapters. After an introduction discussing the importance of the doctrine of hell, the first three chapters address, respectively, sociological data about belief in hell, God’s knowledge, and God’s power. These chapters set the stage for chapter four, which addresses whether God can be perfectly good if hell exists. Walls considers this “the heart of my defense against the claim that the doctrine of eternal hell is immoral” (p. 15). Chapter five then addresses hell and human freedom. Finally, chapter six explores the nature of suffering in hell, such as whether it is only psychological, or also includes a physical dimension.
As the book progresses, it becomes clear that Walls’s own preferred view is the modified orthodox view. In what follows, I would therefore like to focus on this view, which he notes is “how hell is depicted by C. S. Lewis in The Great Divorce” (p. 13). For Lewis (and Walls), “our eternal destiny is not sealed at death; rather, God continues to offer grace after death, so there is no end to the opportunity to receive salvation.” Nevertheless, “some will forever reject God’s grace and experience the corresponding pain of being forever separated from God” (p. 13).¹ In short, hell lasts forever only because some continue to choose it eternally. Since this is their own choice, it is eminently fair, and thus makes the doctrine of hell both intelligible and moral.
One challenge for this view is to explain why anyone would knowingly choose misery forever. Walls’s answer, crucial to his overall argument, is that over time a person’s character becomes fixed. When a person consistently prefers evil to good, “evil gains sufficient potency that the possibility of repentance is all but foreclosed” (p. 124). Drawing upon Kierkegaard and discussing a fascinating array of topics such as self-deception and the motivations for sin, Walls defends this argument against several objections. One especially provocative objection, raised by Thomas Talbott, is that God, seeing that souls are hopelessly lost, would intervene to reset peoples’ characters and provide them with a second chance. In response, Walls contends that God’s intervening to override a person’s freedom in this way “would detract from the seriousness of moral freedom. Such freedom, in its most significant form, requires that we live with the consequences of our choices, at least our decisive choices” (p. 136).
While I find Walls’s analysis of the role of character formation in choosing hell to be plausible, the largest looming question for me has to do with whether the possibility of postmortem repentance is biblical. This is a crucial assumption of Walls’s view, yet he never supports it biblically. I happen to find the notion of countless chances to repent in hell to be an immensely comforting idea which also makes an eternal hell intelligible and moral. However, I am not sure why Walls believes this is actually the case. In fairness, the book is primarily a work in philosophical theology, and so my biblical question may be out of scope. Even so, I would be interested to see if Walls thinks any biblical texts support postmortem repentance, or how he would explain texts that appear to rule it out (e.g., Luke 13:22-30).
A few more criticisms bear brief mention. First, while in the thesis statement of his book Walls aims “to show that some traditional views of hell can be successfully defended” (p. 15), by the end of the book, it is clear that he rejects the first three views he delineates, which are the only views he labels as “traditional.” Thus, somewhat ironically, since Walls never specifies any criteria for a “traditional” view of hell, it is not clear whether his own modified orthodox view counts as a traditional view. So, the key thesis statement of his book is ultimately ambiguous. Another criticism is that Walls never engages anyone from outside the Anglophone world—what do theologians from the majority world think about hell?²
Overall, however, I was quite impressed by the rigor of Walls’s argumentation. If postmortem salvation is indeed a possibility, then Walls probably makes the strongest case that can be made in defense of an eternal hell. Further, I found his analysis of human freedom, character formation, and of the psychological motivations for sin deeply existentially probing. His analysis of self-deception helped me to better understand why humans so often make choices that keep us from flourishing. As a result of reading this book, my posture towards those not in Christ, or to Christians struggling with a particular sin, will be much more sympathetic and compassionate—and serious. My prayer is that by reflecting on why we make choices, the church might help the world to make better choices so that we can all truly thrive—both now and in the eschaton.
[1] This also appears to be the view of John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 136-8.
[2] See Majority World Theology: Christian Doctrine in Global Context (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press 2020), ed. Gene L. Green, Stephen T. Pardue, and K. K. Yeo; especially chapters 42-27.
