Irenaeus on Freedom and Evil

In Against Heresies, the church father Irenaeus (c. 130–202) aims to refute the various Gnostic sects. A pressing question for the Gnostics was “how a world which is the perfect work of a perfect creator can have gone wrong as the present world obviously has.”¹ Although diverse in their teachings, some, such as Saturninus (c. 120), answered that “two kinds of men were formed by the angels, — the one bad, and the other good. And since the demons aid the most wicked, the Savior came for the destruction of evil men and of the demons, but for the salvation of the good.”² Thus, the reason the world has gone awry is that human beings were created by angels, and we are by nature either good or evil.

Irenaeus argues that human beings are not inherently good or evil by nature; rather, God created us all with the power of choice. And yet, God created humans in an infantile state. It is these two facts, freedom and immaturity, that explain the fall of humankind into sin, why evil is present in the world, and even how damnation can be considered just. In what follows, I summarize Irenaeus’s argument, and argue that while his account of the infantile state of human beings is a promising explanation of the fall and of evil, his account of free will needs to be nuanced to address factors such as addiction and upbringing.

Let us take the two components of Irenaeus’s argument, humanity’s free will and immaturity, each in order. Regarding the first, he argues that “men are possessed of free will, and endowed with the faculty of making a choice. It is not true, therefore, that some are by nature good, and others bad.”³ Irenaeus offers two arguments for human free will. The first is biblical; he marshals numerous texts showing that God is non-coercive and that humans can willingly respond to God’s desires if they choose.⁴ In Matthew 23:37, for instance, Jesus laments of Jerusalem, “How often have I desired to gather your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you were not willing!”⁵ There are also many texts where God issues commands towards humans, expecting us to obey them. Why, Irenaeus asks, would God ask us to do something which we are unable to do? He would not. Rather, these texts “exhort men to what [is] good, to act justly and to work righteousness … because it is in our power to do so.”⁶

Irenaeus’s second argument for human freedom is philosophical, relying on our moral intuitions about praise and blame. If people were good or evil by nature rather than by choice, then this would undermine the notions of reward and punishment fundamental to justice: “their being good would be of no consequence, because they were so by nature rather than by will … what credit is it to those who have not aimed at it?”⁷ Irenaeus relies here also on a particular principle about value: “the harder we strive, so much is it the more valuable; while so much the more valuable it is, so much the more should we esteem it.”⁸ This principle will also come into play in his explanation of evil, to which I now turn.

Having defended the concept of human free will, Irenaeus explains evil in terms of the infantile state of human beings: the fall of humankind into sin, just like human sin now, was a stumbling of little children. In response to an objection that God could have made human beings perfect from the beginning, Irenaeus responds that, just as “it certainly is in the power of a mother to give strong food to her infant” but “the child is not yet able to receive [it],” so also “it was possible for God Himself to have made man perfect from the first, but man could not receive this, being as yet an infant.”⁹ Irenaeus then goes even further, suggesting that evil may in fact be necessary in order for humankind to acquire knowledge of the good: “If he had no knowledge of the contrary, could he have had knowledge of the good?”¹⁰

By way of assessment, I find most compelling Irenaeus’s argument that God would not command us to do something which was impossible for us to do. This insight, when used as a lens for the vast array of biblical texts Irenaeus presents, makes it very plausible to take scriptural affirmations of human freedom at face value. I find less compelling Irenaeus’s philosophical argument from praise and blame; I worry that the argument proves too much. If persons who are by nature good should not receive praise for their good acts, does this apply to God, who must surely be good by nature?

I also wonder if Irenaeus’s emphasis on the human power of choice leaves enough room for God’s grace. For instance, in explaining how God is still good even if people choose to damn themselves, Irenaeus’s reasoning appears rather cold: “the light [does not] fail because of those who have blinded themselves … those who fly from the eternal light of God, which contains in itself all good things, are themselves the cause to themselves of their inhabiting eternal darkness, destitute of all good things.”¹¹ This explanation suggests that God never intervenes to break us out of our imprisonment to sin. Yet, the God of Israel helps those who are helpless (Exod 3:7-8).

Irenaeus’s account of free will could be problematic for two further reasons. First, freedom and immaturity alone are not sufficient to explain all bad human choices. Some criminals, for example, are not inherently evil—they just had a bad upbringing, one biased towards evil. Other people may have a genetic predisposition towards addiction. In short, to say that people are evil either by choice or by nature presents a false dilemma; they may also do evil acts because of external influences. Thus, Irenaeus’s account of free will lacks enough nuance.

Secondly, Irenaeus’s account of human free will arguably downplays God’s role in the process of salvation. In discussing whether a person’s having faith is up to them, for instance, Irenaeus infers from texts such as Matthew 9:29 and Mark 9:23 that “man is in his own power with respect to faith.”¹² Thus, since having faith is within our own power, and since anything is possible for the person who has faith, it follows that God’s wrath justly remains on those who do not have faith (John 3:36).¹³ However, he does not address texts such as Ephesians 2:8, which suggest that even our faith is a gracious gift from God—not our own doing.

In fairness to Irenaeus, however, his motivations for emphasizing human choice are understandable in reaction to the Gnostic idea that some humans are good or evil by nature. Moreover, Irenaeus does affirm that the power of human choice comes from God.¹⁴ Thus, he might respond by saying that, although humans choose to have faith, they can only choose this because they were first enabled to by God’s grace. Further, in response to the objection that he presents a false dilemma between choice or nature, Irenaeus might respond that his affirmation of humanity’s infancy actually is a third option. In other words, he could say that addictions and bad upbringings are themselves a result of humanity’s infantile state. A mature, “perfect” humanity would not have these problems (James 1:4).

In drawing to a close, Irenaeus provides a plausible alternative explanation to Saturninus’s Gnostic explanation of evil. This is no small feat. Indeed, the problem of evil is notoriously difficult for Jewish monotheism, which must presuppose a single, good, powerful creator. The Gnostic explanation, by contrast, is easier in the sense that the presence of evil in the world is a given if some humans had evil creators. But, for Irenaeus, this is unacceptable. Evil results from the free choices of growing humans—not an evil nature. And thus, Irenaeus can affirm what Gnosticism cannot—both the perfection and goodness of God and the dignity of all humanity.

[1] Henry Chadwick, The Early Church, rev ed. (London: Penguin, 1993), 81.

[2] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.24.2, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (New York: Scribner, 1899), 349. Unless otherwise noted, translations are from this edition.

[3] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.

[4] Jer 2:19; Matt 5:16; 7:11-13; 8:13 9:23-29; 11:12; 23:37-38; 24:48-51; Mark 9:23; Luke 6:46; 12:35-36; 12:45-47; 21:34; John 3:36; Rom 2:4-7; 1 Cor 6:11-12; 9:24-27; Eph 4:25-29; 1 Pet 2:16.

[5] Unless otherwise noted, Scripture quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV).

[6] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.2.

[7] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.6; cf. 4.39.1.

[8] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.7.

[9] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.38.1.

[10] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.39.1.

[11] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.39.3.

[12] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.5.

[13] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.4; cf. 4.40.1.

[14] Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.37.1.